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Budgetary Institutions in Turkey
Izak Atiyas, Sabanci University, E-mail: izak@sabanciuniv.edu.tr
Serif Sayin, The World Bank

Abstract
This paper examines institutional determinants of budget policy in Turkey. The discussion is based on an
analytical framework, inspired by the recent literature, that treats budgetary institutions as mechanisms that
may potentially resolve agency and common pool problems in a two-stage principal-agent set up that
involves citizens, politicians and the bureaucracy. We first discuss the nature of inter-party competition and
intra-party bargaining and examine how these generate distributive pressures on public resources. We then
review the main features of Turkish budgetary institutions, and, in particular, the role of the central
bureaucratic agencies. We conclude with a discussion of proposals for reform.
1. INTRODUCTION
Public deficits and their finance remain as one of the key unresolved policy issues in Turkey. Turkey is
generally considered to be a successful reformer, especially because of the significant degree of liberalization
that has occurred in the 1980s, in trade and finance, both domestic and international. In macroeconomic
policy, however, Turkey is considered to be less successful, with inflation rates well above 50 percent in
most of the 1990s. Turkey also went through a short-lived but quite severe crisis in 1994, when GNP
declined by 6 percent. In general, budget deficits and the public donmestic debt are seen as key factors that
create macroeconomic instability or make the economy vulnerable to exogenous shocks.
The stock of domestic debt (as a percentage of GNP) has more than doubled since the beginning of the 1990s
(Table 1). The ratio of public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR) to GNP have remained high, between 712 percent in the 1991-97 period. In 1998, the PSBR is estimated to be 8.7 percent of GNP despite an overall
primary surplus of about 3 percent of GNP. In the second half of the 1990s interest payments have absorbed
an increasing share of expenditures. On the other hand, the operational deficit, which excludes that portion of
interest payments required to maintain the stock of public debt constant in real terms, has been quite low
since 1994. Hence, a good part of interest payments has been absorbed to prevent inflationary erosion of the
value of public debt.
While the size of the operational deficits suggests that, at least for the time being, fiscal aggregates are not
out of control, worries remain. The crisis in 1994 still remains in the memories of participants in financial
markets. There is a widespread belief that the crisis was induced by the government's effort to reduce interest
rates beyond levels that would be acceptable to financial markets. In that period, the government cancellation
of auctions of government papers virtually eliminated the market, and eventually precipitated a currency
crisis. The political dynamics that resulted in the policy mistakes is seen to remain largely operative,
potentially making the system vulnerable to gross mistakes in the future as well. The current means of
maintaining fiscal discipline is regarded as fragile: the government is seen as unable to provide fundamental
public services. In addition, most of the burden of the cuts in expenditures which occurred in recent years
have been born by public investments. There is a parallel perception that the allocation of public expenditures
entails significant waste. Patronage, clientelism and politicians' personal gains are seen to dictate the
allocation of public funds, rather than a concern for the general public interest.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the institutional dynamics behind budget policy in Turkey. Recent
literature (Campos and Pradhan, 1996, 1998; von Hagen 1992; von Hagen and Harden, 1994, 1995) has
identified budgetary institutions as important determinants of fiscal policy and outcomes. This paper builds

on that literature and identifies some of the key institutional variables that seem to be especially important in
the Turkish context. After reviewing these variables and discuss how they affect budget outcomes, we derive
our key proposals for reform.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an analytical framework that guides the discussion in
the rest of the paper. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of budgetary institutions in Turkey. After describing
the key actors and their preferences, we examine the way in which political competition generates
distributive pressures. We then discuss the extent to which budget institutions contain these pressures, paying
particular attention to the role of central bureaucratic agencies. The section reviews in detail the procedural
rules that regulate budget preparation, legislation, implementation and audit. Section 4 discusses expenditure
outcomes under the current system. Section 5 proposes some elements of reform. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we develop a simple model of representative democracy. The purpose of the model is to
identify key problems that arise in assuring that the state behaves in the interests of the citizens. Budgetary
institutions are conceptualized as mechanisms (or rules, procedures, incentive systems) that may potentially
resolve these problems in the context of allocation of public resources.
The model outlined here is abstract and omits several factors and key players (such as the media) who play in
important role in the implementation and monitoring of budget policy in real life. These factors will be
introduced later in the sections devoted to the discussion of the Turkish case.
2.1. A principal-agent framework
The proposed framework of representative democracy contains three main types of actors: the voters,
politicians and bureaucrats. The state is treated as an entity endowed with the power to design and enforce
rules. The state is operated by politicians who get elected by voters, and by bureaucrats. Elected politicians
and bureaucrats together make up public officials, or agents of the state, who are authorized to use the state
machinery to produce policy.
The primary principals in this simple model of representative democracy are the voters/citizens. Citizens can
rely on their own (individual and collective) initiatives and the operation of markets for the provision of
goods and services. However, the provision of some goods and services require collective action that citizens
are not able to generate, because of well known problems such as free riding and absence of commitment
mechanisms. These collective goods and services entail not only public goods traditionally defined, but also
policies, rules and institutions that regulate interactions among the various actors in the public and private
sectors, and which may potentially increase social welfare. From a normative point of view, the state is
treated as an entity that acts as the agent of the citizens and whose purpose, in principle, is to provide these
collective goods and services. The problem is that since the agents of the state have the capacity to use the
state machinery to make rules that are binding for all citizens (in other words, state power is coercive), they
are extremely powerful. The problem of the design of the state is to build and enforce institutions (rules,
incentives, and accountability mechanisms) to make sure that the coercive power of the state is indeed used
in the interests of the citizens rather than those of public officials or their affiliates.
The agency relation between the actors of the state and the citizens entails two stages of delegation (Figure
1). In the first stage, citizens delegate authority to politicians to produce public policy (including policy to
raise revenues and use these resources to finance the provision of various goods and services). What is
expected of politicians and of institutions that regulate their behavior is to aggregate diverse demands of
individuals and social groups, and to on the basis of these demands to produce public policies which
maximize social welfare. Given that politicians may have objectives that may diverge from those of the
citizens, incentives must be created to make sure politicians act in the interest of the citizens. Institutions that

are established to ensure that politicians act in the interest of the citizens are called institutions (or
mechanisms) of political accountability.
While politicians are authorized to design public policy, it is the task of the bureaucracy to implement these
policies. Hence implementation entails a second stage of delegation, where now politicians act as the
principals and bureaucrats as the agents. In this relation as well, the interests of the bureaucrats may be
different from those of the politicians. For example, while politicians may be primarily interested in
transferring a particular resource to a particular constituency in the most efficient and least cost manner,
bureaucrats may be interested instead in maximizing their budget or their sphere of influence, or they may be
affiliated with different interest groups, or they may wish to maximize the rents they appropriate, rents which
become available due to superior information they possess in their fields of expertise. Institutions that ensure
that bureaucrats act in the interest of their principals are named institutions of administrative accountability.
Institutions of political and managerial accountability include both formal and informal mechanisms.
Possibly the most important formal institution is the constitution, which lays down the basic principles of the
design the state. These would include both rules that regulate the relations between the citizens and the state,
as well as those that regulate the agency relations within the internal organization of the state. Rules that
define various types of government (such as presidential and parliamentary systems) and different types of
electoral laws are additional examples of institutions of political accountability. Clearly elections are the
most important tools of political accountability available to the citizens. The effectiveness of elections
depends critically on the information available to the citizens with which they can evaluate the performance
of the politicians and the bureaucrats. In addition, formal and informal institutions that affect party structures
and the nature of party competition can also seen as part of political accountability mechanisms.
Administrative accountability mechanisms include administrative law, norms of bureaucratic ethics, and
personnel and remuneration policy. This agency relation also is influenced by the amount of information
available to the politicians about the behavior of bureaucrats.
It should be noted that mechanisms of administrative accountability often try to strike a balance. Even though
the administration is primarily responsible to the politicians, and mechanisms try to facilitate the political
monitoring of bureaucrats, they at the same time prevent politicians from abusing their authority over the
bureaucracy in a way that weakens or undermines their accountability towards citizens. Hence in modern
public sector management the bureaucracy is protected from excessive political discretion. The bureaucracy
is expected to behave under a code of professional ethic which sometimes may encourage bureaucrats to act
in ways which contradict the immediate interests of politicians, but which nevertheless agree with the public
interest.
Similarly, one of the critical dimensions of the relation between the politician and the bureaucracy, which
will be especially relevant for the discussions below on Turkey, is the ability of the politicians to appoint,
promote and demote bureaucrats. Ability to appoint bureaucrats on the one hand allows politicians to work
with persons who share similar social objectives. Hence, it is an effective means of discipline and control. On
the other hand, excessive use of this power may have an adverse effect on the formation of professional and
bureaucratic norms. In many countries, there are formal or informal rules that restrict the scope of political
appointees. As will be discussed below, keeping administrative agencies relatively independent of political
influence may be especially important in the case of those which play a key role in the budget process.
The first general problem that needs to be tackled in the design of the state, then, arises because interests of
the agents typically diverge from those of the principals. This is a standard agency problem. Note that at both
the political and administrative levels, informational problems that make it difficult for the principals to
monitor the agents are potentially substantial. This enables agents to appropriate substantial amounts of
informational rents. Accountability mechanisms try to minimize the impact of this divergence of interests, by
providing appropriate rules and incentives. Note, however, these rules are typically severely "incomplete"
since it is impossible to take account of all future contingencies. Hence design of appropriate incentives in

both stages is difficult.
2.2. Collective dilemmas
The second general problem is that representative democracy itself suffers from collective dilemmas that the
state is supposed to resolve. Various forms of this problem have been studied in recent years (e.g. Weingast,
Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981; Chari and Cole 1993; von Hagen and Harden, 1995, Dixit and Londregan 1996).
It is useful to distinguish two aspects of this problem. The first relates to the norms and institutions that
regulate inter-party competition. For example, to the extent that political competition is carried out on the
basis of promises of distribution of rents to constituencies, that is, to the extent that distributive politics is the
main axis of political competition, more pressure will be generated on public resources. Dixit and Londregan
(1996) have shown that distributive politics is akin to a non-cooperative game among political parties. Even
though each party would like to promise less to voters, competition drives them to promise more 1. If, on the
other hand, the main instrument of political competition is efficiency in the production of public goods, then
one might conjecture that this sort of competition would generate less distributive pressures on the budget.
The second relates to intra-governmental common pool problems. The typical problem here is that the
benefits of public expenditures are often localized to specific constituencies (often dubbed "electoral
districts" in the literature), whereas the financing of public expenditures often entails taxation (including
inflation taxes) on a national scale. Therefore, each member of the cabinet (or member of parliament that can
influence budget policy) internalizes all the benefits of public expenditures but only part of their cost. Such
fragmentation also results in excessive expenditures (for example, von Hagen and Harden, 1995). The
severity of this problem depends on the nature of budgetary institutions, as emphasized in the literature
(Campos and Pradhan, 1996 and 1998, von Hagen, 1992, von Hagen and Harden, 1995), but also on the
organizational and leadership structures of political parties (nature of intra-party bargaining, for short), as
will be discussed in detail below. In addition, the form of the government (that is, whether there is a single
party or majority government) is also expected to play a role.
The design of most states entail central agencies that can potentially help contain the centrifugal forces
generated by collectives dilemmas. These are agencies (often associated with the ministry of finance) which,
compared to politicians are less subject to distributive pressures, and whose task is to act as the custodians of
public monies. Regulations which provide central agencies with decision making or agenda setting authority,
or which enhance their bargaining power can potentially limit distribution of public resources in exchange for
political support2. The literature on budgetary institutions emphasize "strong ministries of finance" as an
important institutional mechanism to overcome common pool problems in public expenditures.
Agency and common pool have three important potential welfare implications. The first problem is that
collective dilemmas associated with distributive politics, whether originating from inter-party competition or
from intra-party or intra-cabinet bargaining, tend to generate excess expenditures and a deficit bias (Chari
and Cole, 1993; Velasco, 1998). Second, they tend to result in allocational inefficiencies, in the sense that
public goods are underproduced and there are excessive transfers (political rents) to special interest groups
(Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1997)3. Distribution of political rents often generates additional welfare
losses, since, due to political constraints, these have to be made through inefficient fiscal instruments4. Third,
there are potential welfare losses associated with cost effectiveness in policy implementation (bureaucratic
rents).
The problems described above are potentially present in all representative democracies. However, countries
differ in the extent to which institutions exist that contain the adverse consequences of both collective
dilemmas and agency problems. Efficiency requires the effective operation of both political and
administrative accountability mechanisms. It is possible to identify several features of such institutions. First,
they should be able to moderate between the diverse distributive demands imposed on the state by different
constituencies, and constrain political responses to these demands. Second, they should be able to limit the
discretionary powers of the state actors, especially their capacity to distribute public resources to gain

advantage in political competition. Third, they should encourage the production of public goods and
discourage particularistic transfers and political and bureaucratic rents. Fourth, they should encourage the
generation of correct information in the system, so that principals can better monitor the agents.
2.3. The role of budgetary institutions
This paper treats budgetary institutions as one of the most important mechanisms of political and
administrative accountability. These institutions regulate interactions between the various actors (citizens,
politicians and the bureaucrats) in the allocation of public resources, with the objective that these resources
are allocated and used in the most efficient manner. The framework presented above, and the potential
problems identified suggest three (not necessarily independent) criteria of efficiency:
1) fiscal discipline: resolve collective dilemmas, constrain deficit biases so as to achieve and maintain
macroeconomic stability
2) allocative inefficiency: ensure that public resources are allocated so as to maximize social welfare (for
example, constrain political rents and distributive transfers in favor of public goods)
3) cost efficiency: deliver public goods and services in the least cost manner (for example, constrain
bureaucratic rents)
For the purposes of this paper, we find it useful to classify budget rules under two headings. First, budgetary
institutions ensure the production, capture and dissemination of various types of information. Three aspects
of this is especially relevant. First, they can generate information for the citizens on how public resources are
used by politicians and bureaucrats. The presumption is that such information enhances political
accountability by enabling citizens, for example, to make more informed choices during elections and vote
out of office those politicians who are deemed to have misused these resources. In order to be useful, such
information would need to be presented in formats which facilitate access and interpretation (for example,
accordance with generally accepted reporting requirements). Second, information related to the activities of
agents at each level of the principal-agent hierarchy within the state can be made available to the respective
principals so as to facilitate monitoring. Third, it is presumed that better and more comprehensive
information helps contain the adverse effects of collective dilemmas. When the budget does not provide
timely and comprehensive fiscal data, the amount of public resources which individual agents of the state can
control and allocate as they see fit is likely to increase, since the overall impact of such increases is not well
detected. Overall, such these rules can be said to ensure transparency.
Second, budget institutions establish specific procedures that need to be followed in the allocation of public
resources, including the specification of what each actor can and cannot do at each stage. These rules can
help ameliorate both agency problems and collective dilemmas. For example, it is often argued that setting
the overall magnitude of expenditures before deciding on expenditure composition may contain the deficit
bias5. The requirement that all expenditures during a year be authorized by the legislature through an annual
budget law may enable politicians to resist distributive demands during the year by reducing discretionary
authority over public resources (and enhance fiscal discipline). Various types of internal controls may limit
the extent to which agents misuse public resources. Hence budgetary institutions serve as vehicles of control
and commitment.
3. TURKISH BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS
3.1. The key actors and basic principal-agent relations
Turkey has a parliamentary system of government. The authority to legislate lies with the Grand National
Assembly (hereafter the parliament) which uses this authority in the name of the nation (to whom
sovereignty belongs). The first stage of delegation therefore involves the delegation of legislative authority

from the nation to the parliament. Members of parliament (MPs) are appointed through elections. Except for
several interruptions due to military takeovers, multi-party elections have existed since the 1950s.
According to the constitution, one of the primary duties of the parliament is tomonitor the cabinet and the
ministers6. The cabinet is headed by the prime minister, who is appointed by the president. The norm here is
that the president appoints the leader of the party that has the largest number of MPs, although recently
leaders who are perceived as likely to form a cabinet that is expected to survive a vote of confidence have
also been appointed. The rest of the members of cabinet (the ministers) are selected by the prime minister,
most frequently from among the governing parties' MPs. The cabinet is collectively responsible for the
conduct of the "general policy" of the government. Each of the ministers is answerable to the prime minister
and is responsible for the administrative units under it. As in most parliamentary systems, most laws drafted
and proposed to the parliament originate with ministers and the cabinet.
The authority to spend money is delegated by the parliament to the cabinet through annual budget laws. The
draft budget is presented by the cabinet and enacted by the parliament. Parliamentary oversight of public
expenditures is carried out by the High Court of Accounts (HCA), which presents its audit (Statement of
Conformity) to the parliament following the end of the fiscal year. Concurrently, the cabinet presents its
Final Accounts Bill, which is voted by the parliament.
The cabinet implements its policies through administrative agencies (the bureaucracy). Administrative
agencies report to their respective ministries. There are various forms of agencies. In addition to ministry
departments or "general budget agencies", there are annex-budget agencies, state economic enterprises, and
agency types funded by extra-budgetary funds and revolving funds. The annual budget covers the general
and annex-budget agencies and a number of extra-budgetary funds.
A few qualifications can be made regarding the agency relation between the parliament and the cabinet. In
most discussions of distribution of power in parliamentary democracies, the cabinet is regarded as
accountable to the parliament. As mentioned above, this is true in the Turkish case as well, since oversight of
the cabinet is identified as one of the constitutional duties of the parliament. However, since in most
parliamentary systems MPs rarely defect from party policy on important legislative issues, and since in the
case of majority governments parties that compose the government also hold the majority of seats in the
parliament, the oversight capacity of the parliament is very restricted. Majority governments can enact
whatever law they wish. At least in the case of majority governments, the oversight capacity of the
parliament essentially boils down to the opposition's right to access information and make that public. The
same is true for budgetary institutions. A majority government essentially can enact any budget that it likes.
The reason that parliamentary oversight may enhance overall accountability is that, at least in principle, by
requesting that expenditures be authorized through a budget, and by requesting, ex-post, a settlement of the
annual fiscal accounts, parliamentary oversight provides better information to citizens and other
stakeholders7. Likewise, the importance of the external audit provided by the High Court of Accounts lies
ultimately in evaluating the quality and validity of the information disclosed by the government, and making
that evaluation public.
Central control agencies play an important role in the preparation and implementation of the budget, though
they are not constitutional entities. These are the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Treasury, the State
Planning Organization (SPO), the State Personnel Office, and, to an extent, the Central Bank. The MOF
contains the general directorate for budget and fiscal control (expenditures), the general directorate for
revenues (taxes), the general directorate for accounting, the property office and the state supply office. It has
primary responsibility for the preparation and the implementation (appropriations release and internal
controls) of the budget. Cash and debt management are under the responsibility of the Treasury, which has
been separated from the MOF in the 1980s. The Treasury is responsible to the Prime Minister; however, in
practice it is run by a minister of state8. The SPO is responsible for authorising public investment projects.
Hence, it has an important role in the preparation of the investment component of the budget. The SPO is
also an important actor in general macroeconomic management and prepares the annual economic programs 9.

As with the Treasury, the SPO is organized under the Prime Ministry, but it is often headed by a state
minister. The annual programs provide some key variables (inflation and exchange rate targets) which are
used by the rest of the actors
in preparing the budget. A fourth important actor is the Central Bank. Even though the central bank does not
take a direct role in the budget process, it is a key player both because central bank advances are potentially
an important source of finance, and also because of the impact of monetary and exchange rate policy on
markets for government securities. Finally, the State Personnel Office is responsible for recruitment and
salary policy.
The division of key responsibilities among various central agencies creates a serious problem of
fragmentation in budget policy. This problem is potentially aggravated by the fact that in the last decade most
governments have been coalition governments. The High Planning Board, headed by the prime minister and
consisting of the central agencies as well as key ministers engaged in economic policy is a forum of
information exchange and collective decision making. However, the amount of coordination it provides is
limited. As will be discussed in more detail below, the degree of inter-agency coordination is an important
determinant of budget policy.
The next step in the analysis of budgetary institutions is to describe the objectives and incentives of each of
the players described above. We start with politicians.
3.2. Political competition and the generation of political liabilities
Electoral competition in Turkey is characterized by a deep-rooted legacy of "populism", or distributive
politics, whereby the use of public resources to generate political support has become the main instrument
through which a political party tries to gain advantage over its competitors. Since this is the predominant
source of distributive pressures on the budget, it is worth examining it in some detail.
A candidate running for office faces two sets of competitive challenges. First, she has to compete within her
party to become a candidate in (local or national) elections. Second, she has to compete with candidates from
other parties to win elections. For intra-party competition, she has to gain the support both of the party leader,
and of critical networks within the party. The first set of liabilities are generated when the candidate seeks the
support of local and party notables, and of delegates who play an important role in the formation of party
hierarchies across the country. Such support is generated in return for promises of patronage, or transfers, or
procurement contracts, promises that would be realized in case the candidate is successful in gaining political
influence. At the second stage, the candidate needs the support of voter constituencies. Party and local
notables play an important role in this process as well, because of their organizational and networking skills.
Promises of transfers to the electorate (for example, in terms of higher agricultural support prices in rural
areas, or granting ownership of illegally occupied land in urban shantytowns) form the second large set of
liabilities.
Note that this process of liability formation suffers from collective dilemmas as well. In principle politicians
would prefer to bear less liabilities since that would increase their command over public resources. However,
their resistance is severely limited by the threat of competition, much in the spirit of Dixit and Londregan
(1996). From the perspective of constituents, the end result of distributive demands is likely to be
macroeconomic stability and inflation. However, given that politicians are likely to be responsive to the
distributive demands of the rest of the interest groups, each individual group will find it optimal to put
pressure on politicians.
It is often argued that political leadership may be an effective tool in resolving collective dilemmas within an
organization. Parties whose leadership structures provide leaders with extensive power to use selective
incentives may be able to internalize the externalities associated with collective dilemmas and protect the
collective interests of the party (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, especially chapters 4 and 5). The nature of this

delegation can be thought of as an incomplete contract, or a set of rules that determine the actions that leaders
can take under particular circumstances, or the nature and degree of discretion that they can assume. It has
often been argued that political parties in Turkey have "oligarchic" leadership structures, that party leaders
demand absolute loyalty from their members, and that they play an important role in deciding on party
policy, in the internal advancement of party members and in determining which of the candidates will run for
office (Turan 1995). However, this dominance comes at a significant price: In return for complete loyalty,
party leaders have to cater to the distributive demands of their followers, especially those who represent
significant networks of support10. This reciprocal web of interdependence for particularistic benefits has
become the main glue that holds parties together. As a result, party leaders' incentives to pursue the collective
interests of the party are weakened by the features of intra-party bargaining.
Features of both inter-party competition and intra-party bargaining make politicians very responsive to
distributive demands. This tendency is further reinforced by expectations that guide voter behavior. Populism
in Turkey has historical roots in the development of multi-party democracy and is deeply ingrained in the
political culture (Heper and Keyman, 1997; Sunar, 1990). Distributive demands by constituencies are more
than straightforward expressions of pursuit of self-interest. In addition, responding to constituency demands
for government support have been seen as a primary duty of the state. The state has been perceived as an
"institution that guarantees the livelihood of broad strata of the population" (Önis and Webb, 1994: 135; see
also Heper, 1985).
3.3. The role of the central agencies
Overall, compared to politicians, the central agencies are much less direct stakeholders in distributive
politics. In addition, there is within the central agencies an overall negative sentiment against populism and
distributive politics11. For example, the central agencies are likely to be more inclined to maintain
macroeconomic stability, or to resist gross violations of allocative efficiency (e.g. in the case of blatant
transfers of rents to interest groups). Potentially, then, the central agencies may play an important role in
restraining the adverse effects of distributive politics. Alternatively, they can help insulate politicians from
distributive pressures. Whether or not they play this role effectively depends on their bargaining power and
which decisions are delegated to them during the budget process.
Among the various factors that influence their bargaining power, two seem especially important: The first is
the personalities of top appointments (say at the level of undersecretary and deputy undersecretary). Strong
and competent personalities increase agency independence, and expand the range of decisions that are likely
to be less influenced by short term political priorities of the government. From the point of view of the
cabinet, appointments of strong and competent personalities to central agencies may potentially act as an
instrument of strategic delegation and enable politicians to be more resistant against distributive demands.
The second factor (not necessarily independent from the first) is the degree of inter-agency coordination.
Division lines among central agencies (and among bureaucratic agencies in general) are thick, and procedural
mechanisms for inter-agency coordination and cooperation are weak. Even though preferences of the central
agencies are likely to be more or less aligned on issues such as fiscal discipline, there are also potential
conflicts over distribution of authority. In other words, each agency would like to maximize its influence
over public resources and policy decisions, a conflict which is potentially zero-sum. The fact that agencies
which were originally organized under a single entity (MOF) have been separated in the recent past has
exacerbated problems of trust between agencies12. These make cooperation on non-conflictual issues difficult
and fragile as well.
Inter-agency coordination has also been weakened by the way responsibility for economic policy has been
distributed in the cabinet. Since 1991, all governments except one have been coalition governments. There
have often been two or three ministers responsible for economic and budget policy. Until recently, most of
these Ministers were appointed by the senior ccoalition partner. Hence, the central agencies used to report to
ministers from the same party, and the senior partners of coalition governments used to have control over

fiscal management. This has changed under the last few governments. Under the government before last, for
example, the SPO and the Treasury reported to ministers from the senior partner, but the minister of finance
was from the junior partner. However, even when agencies report to ministers from the same party, this does
not guarantee enhanced coordination. There have been cases in recent history where problems between
central agencies have risen due to lack of coordination and personal strife between ministers belonging to the
same political party. This can be seen as a direct consequence of the fact that expertise in specific policy
areas often has very low weight in ministerial appointments. Party leaders are more likely to appoint as
ministers people who are loyal or who belong to key networks. As a result, coherent public policy is often not
among ministers' top priorities, or even when it is, ministers are not necessarily well equipped to deal with it.
The degree of coordination among central agencies has increased over the years. Close cooperation between
the treasury and the central bank in debt management is well recognized and appreciated by the financial
markets. Furthermore, the SPO, the Treasury, and the MOF work together during budget preparation.
However, such coordination is not fully institutionalized, and results from the personal efforts of bureaucrats.
More importantly, the impact of these efforts is weakened by other shortcomings of the budget system,
discussed below.
3.4. Budget coverage
The term budget coverage is used to cover both dimensions of the budget process mentioned above (section
2.3). The first is coverage in terms of commitment and control, that is, whether activities which use public
resources are carried out with prior authorization from the parliament through a budget law. The second is
coverage in terms of the transparency function of the budget. That is, irrespective of whether authorized by
the parliament, do all forms of expenditure of public resources get reported or accounted for?
The coverage of budget laws in Turkey is limited in both respects. An important part of public expenditures
is undertaken without requesting the approval of the legislature (Figure 2). As a result, parliamentary
oversight over the executive is further diminished. The fact that the government can spend public resources
outside the budget both increases the government's discretion and reduces transparency since it becomes
much more difficult for the public or the opposition to monitor how public resources are spent.
Important expenditure items not covered in the budget include the state banks' quasi-fiscal operations
(especially subsidized credit), subsidies provided through SEEs (especially for agriculture), tax expenditures,
contingent liabilities that arise from Treasury guarantees offered to debt issued by public agencies (such as
local governments), capital commitments (commitments for future expenditures on investment projects
approved by the SPO). There are also extra-budgetary funds and over three thousand revolving funds that are
not covered by the budget.
Some of these off-budget activities are reported ex-post by the SPO. The annual programs contain data on
"public sector balances" which document receipts, expenditures and borrowing requirements for key public
sector entities (agencies covered by the consolidated budget, financial and non-financial state economic
enterprises, local governments, social security institutions, revolving funds and extra-budgetary funds).
However, important items such as contingent liabilities, part of quasi-fiscal activities of state-banks (see
below), and tax expenditures are not reported at all13.
Quasi-fiscal activities of state banks and non-financial SEEs are especially important in terms of size, in
terms of the amount of discretion they provide to politicians over public resources, and in terms of their lack
of transparency14. More concretely, budgetary coverage of quasi-fiscal operations is limited in two respects:
First, typically quasi-fiscal expenditures are spent without prior appropriations from the budget. Most of
these activities generate "duty losses" which need to be compensated by the Treasury. Appropriations to
cover these duty losses are made ex-post. Hence, these expenditures are very discretionary, and are carried
out with incomplete or no prior authorization from the parliament15. Second, coverage is limited in terms of
provision of information on the use of public resources. Even ex-post budgetary allocations against duty

losses do not fully compensate for them, so they accumulate over the years, sometimes at very high interest
rates. Hence, not only some quasi-fiscal activities are not reflected in annual budgets (or even in total PSBR)
for a number of years, in addition, at any point in time, the reported stock of domestic debt underestimates
the total stock of liabilities of the government. Ultimately, these liabilities are recognized when The Treasury
(typically) issues off-budget "non-cash" securities against them16. The stock of such non-cash government
securities have remained at 4-5 percent of GNP in the 1993-97 period17.
There is practically no information generated to evaluate the performance of the spending agencies. Hence,
the role of the budget in generating mechanisms for administrative accountability is limited to formal
compliance requirements. There is also no information with which policy outcomes (welfare impact of
expenditures) can be evaluated. Many ministries produce annual reports, which contain some information on
policy outputs (amount of goods and services provided), but the budget process makes no use of these
reports.
3.5. Features of budget preparation, legislation and implementation
Specific procedures followed in budget preparation, legislation, and implementation are also important
determinants of budget outcomes (von Hagen, Campos and Pradhan). A summary of the budget cycle in
Turkey is provided in Table 2.
The budget preparation process in principle could provide a forum where the cabinet, with the help of the
central agencies, establishes the strategic priorities of the government. The purpose here would be to
aggregate over the different interests represented by the line ministries, both so as to maintain aggregate
fiscal discipline, as well as to ensure that resources are allocated to areas that the government identifies as
political priorities.
The literature suggests several institutional measures to reach these goals. It is often argued that
strengthening the position of the prime minister and the minister primarily responsible for the budget
(normally the MOF) against those of the line ministries is likely to help achieve or maintain aggregate fiscal
discipline, since both are more likely to protect the collective interests of the government. Setting or agreeing
on aggregate ceilings on expenditures in advance of bargaining over their composition is sometimes seen as a
procedural measure that serves a similar purpose18. Another institutional device is a medium term fiscal
planning framework that would provide estimates of future costs of alternative policies (called forward
estimates in Australia, see Campos and Pradhan 1996, 1998). This would not only increase the quality of
cabinet decisions, but also enhance transparency, and, consequently, the accountability of politicians to the
citizens. Finally, a process of evaluation of the welfare impacts of alternative policies and an information and
reporting system to support it would enhance allocational efficiency.
None of these institutions exist in Turkey. The system works as follows (Table 2). Bids are collected from
central ministries, and then a bargaining takes place between line ministries and the central agencies. Fiscal
aggregates are established as a result of agreements reached in this bargaining process. In some cases where
serious cuts in the bids are needed (for example, due to a short-term stabilization program) these are carried
out across the board. The budget preparation process entails no serious evaluation or prioritization. When the
system works well (eg when the central agencies are given bargaining power, due, say, to strong
undersecretaries), the preparation stage can produce realistic budgets which aim to maintain fiscal discipline.
It has been suggested that the features of the budget legislation process may also have an impact on aggregate
fiscal discipline (von Hagen 1992, von Hagen and Harden 1994). The legislation stage has two components.
First the budget proposal is presented to the parliamentary committee on planning and budgeting. The
committee can propose any types of amendments on the budget. The government (be it single-party or
coalition) holds the majority in the committee. The composition of this committee has varied over the years.
In some exceptional years this committee has consisted of deputies who have expertise on economic and
fiscal issues. However, in general, membership in the committee serves as a step of intra-party promotion,

and expertise has not been an overriding criterion in appointments into the committee. In recent years there
have been examples where members of the committee have made marginally increased appropriations for
their electoral districts.
The second stage is discussion in the general assembly and enactment by the parliament. The features of this
process in Turkey are essentially similar to those that have been suggested to increase fiscal discipline (e.g.
von Hagen, 1992). The constitution forbids amendments to decrease revenues or increase expenditures. In
fact, in most cases proposed budgets are enacted without significant changes.
The stage that really determines budgetary outcomes in Turkey is implementation. Appropriations and cash
releases are at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury, respectively. Due to high inflation
both become extremely politicized and the whole implementation process becomes a grand bargaining game
between the central agencies, the rest of the bureaucracy, ministers, members of parliament and others,
including local governments. In particular, the MOF and the Treasury are under constant pressure from
politicians to favor their expenditure items over others' in releasing appropriations or cash.
More importantly, there are various ways in which actual expenditures may exceed appropriations identified
in the budget law. The most obvious way of doing that is through supplementary budgets, which a
government can easily enact as long as it has a majority in the parliament. This mechanism has been
extensively used in the past (almost every year in the last decade) so that now it has become a norm. Relative
to budget laws enacted before the beginning of the fiscal year, supplementary budgets generate much less
public debate. The expectation that supplementary budgets can be passed through the parliament without
much difficulty, and without much public debate, makes budget preparation a less than completely serious
activity. The budget law has lost its potential commitment value.
In addition to supplementary budgets, there are additional means through which actual expenditures may
surpass appropriations in the budget law. A prominent mechanism is requesting "supplementary
appropriations" in the Final Accounts Bill. Some of these complementary appropriations are allowed under
the Public Accounting Law. Such "legal supplementary appropriations", as they are called in Turkey, are
very small in magnitude, and only a small class of expenditures are eligible for this kind of treatment.
However, in the past, governments have requested and obtained complementary appropriations for interest
and personnel expenditures as well, without any clear legal basis. Overall, however, compared to
supplementary budgets, the magnitude of supplementary appropriations has not been very large and have
reached at most a few percentages of total expenditures.
The fact that the commitment value of budget laws is weak is evident from ex-post gaps between budgetary
appropriations and realized expenditures. These gaps were about 4 percent of GNP in 1994 and 8 percent in
1997. Moreover, the deficit seems highly correlated with the gap (Figure 3).
3.6. External Monitoring
Formal external audit of the budget is done by the High Court of Accounts. The constitution authorizes the
Court of Accounts to audit, on behalf of the parliament, the revenues and expenditures of all public agencies
covered by the consolidated budget. The audit of the budget is done primarily through a Statement of
Conformity. HCA audits are not fully effective. First, the audit is restricted to compliance. The Court does
not have a tradition of producing information on the allocative and cost efficiency of expenditures. Second,
an important portion of public expenditures is outside the domain of the Court. The audit of state economic
enterprises is carried out by the High Audit Board, which reports to the Prime Minister, and therefore is in
principle open to political influence. Gonul (1997) estimates that about half of expenditure transactions
(amounting to about 14 percent of public expenditures) escapes the HCA's audit. Third, and perhaps more
importantly, the Statement of Conformity does not create much public debate and the HCA has not been very
active in creating one. As a result, the HCA reports do not have much bite. In a few occasions, the HCA has
warned members of the parliament of the illegality of some supplementary appropriations requested by the

government, but has not been successful in either stopping the parliament from granting them, or in creating
a public awareness on the issue.
There are two additional sources of external monitoring that are becoming particularly important in Turkey:
financial markets and the press. Financial markets in Turkey have been liberalized in the 1980s, and the
Turkish lira is fully convertible since the 1989. As emphasized by Campos and Pradhan (1996), open
financial markets potentially exert discipline on fiscal policy. In addition, the domestic banking system is the
primary holder of government securities. Since 1994, when an attempt by the government to bypass the
financial system by resorting to central bank advances resulted in a major financial crisis, the financial
system is recognized by governments as an indispensable partner in financing deficits and rolling over the
domestic debt. This has allowed the central agencies in taking albeit small steps in reducing the degree of
discretion in public finances. For example, in the last two years the treasury has started announcing
borrowing programs that specify the timing and magnitude of auctions of government securities that are to be
held in the near future19. The degree to which these programs can actually discipline public expenditures
depends on the costs (as perceived by the government and the bureaucracy) of deviating from them. While
we do not have estimates of these costs, our current impression is that the Treasury has been successful in
convincing governments of the benefits of adhering to these programs.
Freedom of the press is, and has been for quite some time, fully operational on matters of economic policy.
However, freedom of the press does not by itself imply effective monitoring and pressure by the public20.
There are at least two additional conditions that need to be met. The first is an educated press coverage of
economic policy issues. The level of expertise on economic policy issues has increased significantly in recent
years. The second is an ability to focus public discussion on key issues. The problem of achieving efficiency
in the allocation of public resources is not necessarily a straightforward problem. In order to enhance public
awareness, critical themes such as excessive discretion, transparency and the coverage of the budget need to
be placed on the agenda of public opinion. The press can potentially play an important role in focussing
public attention on a number of key variables and concepts to monitor and evaluate fiscal policy. The Turkish
press is becoming morecompetent in carrying out that function as well.
In recent years, there have been several occasions in which the press has played a significant role in
introducing and publicising attempts by the bureaucracy to improve transparency and maintain fiscal
discipline. The Treasury borrowing programs mentioned above were greeted with significant media support.
Newspapers have been active in monitoring agricultural support prices, and specifying, most possibly on the
basis of leaks from the central agencies, thresholds above which such prices would reflect "populistic
behavior". In 1998, as a result of prodding from the central agencies, the government promised to refrain
from issuing a supplementary budget. The media has been active in keeping that promise in the public
agenda. To our knowledge, this was the first time that the media made an issue out of supplementary budgets.
Similarly, the idea that excessive political discretion over the allocation of public resources may harm the
public interest is being discussed more frequently by economic columnists.
4. EVALUATION OF BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS
In this section we evaluate budgetary institutions in Turkey using the framework developed in Campos and
Pradhan (1996). Their framework identifies three levels of assessment: aggregate fiscal discipline, strategic
prioritization and technical efficiency. Following them, at each level we consider the key institutional
arrangements, accountability and transparency mechanisms.
4.1. Aggregate fiscal discipline
A. Macro framework and coordination mechanism
The annual programs provide a limited macro framework. There is no multi-period framework or forward
estimates. The program is published and available to the public.

B. Dominance of central ministries
Even though formally the prime minister and the MOF are central figures in the budget process, their
positions are weakened by the general prevalence of distributive politics.
C. Formal constraints
There are no formal constraints on budget deficits or on the level of domestic or foreign debt. There is a
constraint on the amount of central bank advances that the Treasury can utilize.
D. Hard budget constraints
In principle expenditures cannot exceed appropriations in the budget. However, in practice this constraint is
rendered meaningless through the use of supplementary budgets. There are no formal hard budget constraints
on state economic enterprises.
E. Comprehensiveness of the budget
Very limited. See figure 3.
Regarding accountability, two of the mechanisms mentioned by Campos and Pradhan exist in Turkey: Expost reconciliation is done through the Final Accounts Bill, which is not closely monitored by the public.
Openness of financial markets exists fully, as mentioned above. Sanctions for central ministries do not exist.
4.2. Strategic prioritization
A. System for comparing medium-term costs of competing policies
Both the Treasury and the SPO use macro-econometric models, however these are useful for comparing
alternative macroeconomic scenarios, not for evaluating the allocative efficiency of fiscal expenditures. The
SPO has expertise to evaluate investment projects, and follows key sectors closely. They do carry out some
prioritization regarding investment expenditures but in a de-facto manner. In recent years, due to fiscal
deterioration, the share of investment in budgetary outlays has been reduced significantly.
B. Comprehensiveness of the budget
Very limited. See figure 3.
C. Flexibility of line agencies
Almost non-existent.
D. Breadth of consultations
There is almost no feedback from civil society, except for public pressure as reflected in the media. However,
there is significant pressure that politicians do take into account, that results in distributive politics. For
example, there is always pressure for higher agricultural support prices, or public wages and salaries.
E. Use of objective criteria
None.

Reporting on outcomes and ex-post evaluations occur very rarely, if at all. The technical capacity of the
parliament is limited as well. Hence, the accountability and transparency mechanisms identified by Campos
and Pradhan (1996) do not exist.
4.3. Technical efficiency
A. Civil service pay and merit based recruitment/promotion
In general, civil service pay is lower than private sector standards. The role of merit in recruitment and
promotion in central agencies is quite important. Line ministries are much more instruments of political
patronage.
B. Managerial autonomy of line agencies
Does not exist.
C. Predictability of resource flow
Both appropriations and cash release are highly politicized. However, in 1998 the MOF and the Treasury
tried to coordinate on a release program.
As mechanisms to encourage accountability and transparency in technical efficiency, Campos and Pradhan
list clarity of purpose/task, introduction of fixed-term contracts for chief executives, creation of financial
accounts and audits for line agencies, client surveys and contestability in service delivery. To our best
knowledge, none of these exist for line ministries.
5. EXPENDITURE OUTCOMES
The crisis in 1994 has affected the relation between the politicians and the central agencies. The spectre of
major macroeconomic disruptions or financial crises seems to have convinced politicians to delegate more
responsibility to the central agencies in the design and conduct of budget policy. In turn, the central agencies
have used this opportunity to restrain public expenditures and prevent major macroeconomic disruptions. As
a result, fiscal aggregates, as measured by operational deficits, have remained under control (Table 1). On the
other hand, the central bureaucracy has not been able to engage in major reforms or drastic policy initiatives.
A few additional factors may have facilitated the maintenance of fiscal discipline over the last few years.
First, payments on the accumulated domestic public debt have greatly reduced resources available for
distribution. Here we also suspect that a prevalence of a type of money illusion has probably helped
bureaucrats. The notion that a good part of interest payments in fact is primarily absorbed to compensate for
the inflationary erosion of the stock of debt is somewhat new and foreign to politicians. Our sense is that the
realization of the fact that fiscal aggregates have been under control is likely to increase pressures for
distributive politics. In fact, especially the Treasury seems to have been careful in not creating a celebratory
atmosphere over the performance of the last two years. Second, the fact that economic policy making has
been fragmented at the cabinet level may have actually helped the hands of the bureaucrats. The increase in
the degree of fragmentation within the cabinet has coincided with increased efforts for inter-agency
coordination, and has helped central agencies in resisting demands for distributive transfers.
This sense of enhanced aggregate fiscal discipline has been gained at the expense of substantial costs in terms
of various forms of inefficiencies. The first type of inefficiency is the under- provision of public goods and
services (defined in general terms, including public policies) and over -production of particularistic goods
and services. For the case of Turkey, the most evident public good that is under-produced is possibly
macroeconomic stability. In addition, it has become increasingly clear in the last few years that the state has

faced severe difficulties in carrying out its most fundamental functions, including such things as the
provision of law, order and justice. Expenditures for social services such as education and health are
extremely low. The share of investments in total outlays from the budget has decreased from 19-20 percent in
1981-87 to less than 10 percent in the 1990s.
The distribution of public resources as rents, besides resulting in under-production of public goods, entails
additional losses. We conjecture that inefficiencies of the sort examined by Coate and Morris (1997) are very
large in Turkey. To give one example, the government cannot simply give lump-sum subsidies to their
contractors that support them. Instead, these have to be disguised as public projects that consume real
resources, but the social values of which are low. Indeed, there have been a large number of stories of
unfinished public projects whose main beneficiaries are contractors. Similarly, it is well known that support
prices for agricultural products have large distortionary effects (Kasnakoglu and Cakmak, 1998; nash, n.d.).
Finally, we suspect that cost efficiency in the provision of public goods and services is very low. News of
corruption in public procurement have exploded over the last few years. This is one area where we suspect
that there is extensive collusion between politicians and bureaucrats. While corruption in public procurement
reflects major weaknesses in procurement regulations, it is facilitated by the compliance oriented execution
of external audit.
6. ELEMENTS OF REFORM
Reform of budgetary institutions should have two immediate objectives. Thefirst is to reduce the degree of
discretion in expenditure policy. The second is to increase the degree of comprehensiveness and transparency
of fiscal accounts. Realization of these objectives would both increase fiscal control and constrain public
expenditures, enhance the credibility of announced fiscal policy, and increase public confidence.
There are several measures that can be undertaken to reach these objectives. The most immediate step is
making the fiscal implications of quasi-fiscal operations transparent. A partial approach to this problem
would require closer monitoring of these operations, and instituting a system of flow of information that
would generate the fiscal implications of these operations without a delay.
A more comprehensive approach to increase transparency would overhaul the government reporting
requirements altogether. The most effective means of doing so would be to publish a balance sheet of the
state, with its supporting documents21. Initially, the balance sheet may capture current assets and liabilities of
the central government. The balance sheet can be accompanied with additional financial tables that capture
contingent liabilities, commitments and cash flow. The primary data for the balance sheet is available in the
Treasury and in the agencies that carry out quasi-fiscal operations. It is expected that treasury guarantees
form the bulk of contingent liabilities, hence the primary data for that is also available. The main source of
commitments is probably the stock of programmed and ongoing public investments, the record of which is
available in the SPO.
The second element of budget reform focuses on increasing the comprehensiveness of the budget itself. This
is essential to reduce discretionary expenditures. In most cases the current legal framework delegates the
authority to generate duty losses to either the cabinet of the relevant agency. Hence, quasi-fiscal operations
are undertaken with no link to the budget. The budget should impose limits on the maximum amount of duty
losses that can be generated within the year. These limits should be treated like all the appropriations in the
budget and should not be overridden by cabinet decisions. More generally, the budget should cover all public
expenditures22.
Introduction of a medium term fiscal program is an another potentially important component of reform. In
the Turkish context, this would serve two purposes. First, it would play a crucial role in clarifying the
medium term revenue and expenditure implications of current policies. This helps increase discipline on the
current budget preparation process. It has been argued that the practice of providing forward estimates, and

reporting ex-post deviations from these estimates has helped increase the accountability of politicians and
bureaucrats in countries which have reformed their budgetary institutions (Campos and Pradhan, 1996).
Second, it would enhance the degree of coordination among the central agencies. Currently such coordination
takes place during the preparation of the annual programs (published by the SPO) and the annual budgets. A
medium term fiscal program would act as a more effective mechanism to coordinate the strategies and
expectations of the central agencies.
Another element of reform is the de-politization the appropriations and cash rationing process. This can be
achieved by having the MOF and Treasury jointly draw up an appropriations and cash release program and
make that public. Some progress towards a coordinated and programmed release of expenditures has been
made in the recent past.
The most important tools of discretion in the current system are supplementary budgets. Restricting
supplementary budgets would require constitutional amendments23. However even an announcement of a
commitment to avoid supplementary budgets may have some signalling value, especially if accompanied by
additional actions that increase the transparency of fiscal accounts, and reduces the discretionary powers of
the executive.
Most of the measures mentioned above target the establishment of aggregate fiscal discipline and
consolidation of advances made in this regard over the last few years. One can also mention a second set of
measures which primarily aim at increasing the allocative and cost efficiency expenditure policy. This
requires better monitoring of public expenditure programs and evaluation of their impact on social welfare.
The absence of evaluation in the current system not only generates cost and allocative inefficiencies, but also
makes strategic prioritization at the budget preparation stage extremely difficult. As a result, whenever
budget cuts have been necessary, they have been carried out across the board, without a strategic focus.
Hence, absence of evaluation also further complicates the establishment of aggregate fiscal discipline.
Substantial capacity for evaluation already exists, especially in the SPO, which houses a large number of
sectoral experts. This expertise can be easily mobilized for evaluating specific programs that consume a large
amount of resources.
The recent behavior of the central agencies strongly suggests that they are likely to be willing participants in
a comprehensive reform program. They could even play a leading or guiding role under a benign or reformminded government that is willing to delegate responsibility to the central bureaucracy. On the other hand,
bureaucratic initiatives under an obstructionist government, or a government with strong tendencies of
distributive politics, are likely to remain timid or unsuccessful. Any reform strategy that aims at substantially
changing the existing inter-agency distribution of power or authority (as could be the case, for example, if
one intended to reduce the degree of fragmentation) is likely to face significant resistance from the losing
agency. Such resistance would probably result in an effective veto, unless the government in question is very
strong, a prospect that does not seem to be likely in the near future.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the institutional determinants of fiscal policy outcomes in Turkey. It has argued that
the nature of political competition generates strong tendencies for distributive politics, which creates strong
pressures to use public resources for political benefits. The budgetary institutions accommodate these
tendencies in several ways. Budget laws cover only a portion of government expenditures, providing
politicians with substantial amounts of discretionary public resources that can be spent outside the budget.
Budget laws are not binding and supplementary budgets are frequently enacted. Independent external audit is
weak. There is little evaluation of the welfare impact of public expenditures. Fiscal discipline, whenever
achieved, is mainly established by across-the-board cuts in current expenditures and substantial reductions in
public investments.
The central agencies are important players in the budget process, and especially after the crisis in 1994, have

played a crucial role in preventing runaway budget deficits and major macroeconomic disruptions. They have
also engaged in several recent initiatives to enhance transparency and reduce discretion. However, they are
not likely to engage in a comprehensive reform effort unless they perceive some support, or at least
acceptance from the politicians.
The paper argues that enhancing transparency is a crucial step in the reform of budgetary institutions. This
would entail expanding budget coverage so as to account for all activities using public resources. We propose
that the most efficient means of achieving transparency is through the publication of a balance sheet of the
government and supporting financial reports. Introduction of a medium term fiscal program would both
enhance transparency and increase the degree of coordination among central agencies. The most efficient
means of restricting the use of supplementary budgets is to change the constitution. However, our impression
is that announcements of commitments to refrain from issuing supplementary budgets in a number of
consecutive budget cycles would be an effective means to increase public awareness and increase the
political cost of issuing supplementary budgets for future governments as well.
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Mediterranean Development Forum, Marrakech, Morocco, September 3-6,
1998. We are grateful to Ersin Kalaycioglu and Dani Rodrik for helpful comments.

End Notes
We do not intend to imply that redistribution is always undesirable. We would like to distinguish redistributive rents resulting
purely from constituency politics (and which would be considered as wasteful by most citizens), from comprehensive redistributive
social programs (which, for example, may target the poor) which would be seen by most citizens as socially beneficial. The
distinction is admittedly vague for general purposes, but the framework is most useful for cases where the distinction is evident and
easily recognized. Dixit and Londregan (1996) make a similar point.
1

2 If

the central agencies are to play this role, then they must not collude with politicians. One factor which may prevent collusion is
an institutional culture (a collective preference, or a code of ethics) that favors the "public interest", and which is critical of
distributive politics.
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) show that under some conditions, including that the social welfare function is symmetric,
the socially optimal policy would entail no distributive transfers, and all resources would be used to finance the production of
public goods at the first-best level. They further show that most political institutions fail to generate the socially optimal policy.
3

In a recent paper Coate and Morris (1997) show that, when information is imperfect, governments may choose to use inefficient
instruments to transfer public resources to special interest groups because they would like to disguise such transfers and present
them as public goods that benefit ordinary citizens.
4

5 As

will be discussed below, there is some controversy on this proposition.

6 The

executive consists of the Presidency and the Council of Ministers (the cabinet), including the prime minister. The presidency,
even though quite influential in other aspects of government (especially recently) has a more minor role in budget policy.
7 Other

important stakeholders are financial markets and the media. See below.

8The

number of ministers of state has increased over the years. Many have been created by party leaders in order to reward highranking party loyals and notables.
9The

SPO also prepares "five year economic plans". While the plans do provide a general direction, they are not binding, and do
not play an important role in policy discussions.
10 Also,

party notables' threat of exit (more correctly, the threat of joining another party) has proven to be very effective in making
leaders responsive to their demands, as evidenced by "markets of parliamentarians" that surface every so often.
11We

might add that recruitment in central agencies is done on a merit basis, and the general level of competence is higher than the
rest of the bureaucracy.

There are certain issues that immediately thickens the division lines and instigates turf battles. For example, whether or not the
Treasury should remain in its current status, or should be returned to the MOF is one such issue. In general, any proposal that
disturbs the status quo by redistributing power from one agency to another is sure to be vetoed by the losing agency. Distribution of
credit and blame is also a potential source of conflict.
12

13 Not

only to the general public, but the government itself does not have a clear idea on the magnitude of most of these items.

14 Some

components of quasi-fiscal activities of state banks are discussed in detail in Atiyas, Bal-Gündüz, Emil, Erdem and Özgün

(1998).
There are some quasi-fiscal activities (such as some subsidized agricultural credit lines) that are not even eligible to be
considered as duty losses. Losses associated with these particular activities need to be financed by the public agency in question.
15

The Treasury also engages in debt restructuring with the other public entities, including the Central Bank. These off-budget
operations transfer resources to public entities (especially SEEs) against equivalent obligations to the Treasury, typically to service
debt liabilities to third parties.
16

17 In

the same period, total domestic debt has increased from 13 to 20 percent of GNP (see Table 1). Atiyas et.al. estimate that as of
the end of 1997, the stock of duty losses at two state banks (that is, claims on the Treasury awaiting some sort of repayment
through budgetary allocations or non-cash securities) were about 3.6 percent of GNP. In the same year, the flow of duty losses
generated by these two banks, net of payments by the treasury, was about 0.9 percent of GNP.
This is a controversial issue. Even though most public sector financial management experts argues that so called "top-down"
budgeting enhances aggregate fiscal discipline, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997) argue that what resolves the common pool
problem is not the sequencing of budget decisions (aggregate first, components later) but the centralization (delegating the decision
on the aggregate budget to an agenda setter).
18

While initially these were announced on a monthly basis, a six-month program was announced in July 1998, and a 3-month
program in January 1999.
19

For example, the press may collude with government officials on mutually beneficial issues and to the detriment of public
interest. Such collusion occurs frequently in Turkey.
20

For a discussion of basic principles that should guide the the design of a balance sheet of the state in the Turkish context, see
Emil (1997).
21

22 In

recent years budget laws have provided upper bounds on the amount of guarantees that can be advanced by the Treasury. The
effect of these bounds have been limited because the cabinet was given the authority to increase these limits.
23 For

example, one proposal could be to require a super-majority in the parliament.
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